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Serbia now has a pro-European parliament, but the country’s
path to EU accession looks as uncertain as ever
The pro-European Serbian Progressive Party secured a clear victory in
Serbia’s elections on 16 March. Denisa Kostovicova writes that while Serbia
now has a pro-European parliament, the country’s path to EU accession is
more complex than it appears. The new government will have a notably
pragmatic approach to Europe, but the issue of Kosovo is still likely to present
a challenge in negotiations.
The extent of  the electoral victory in Serbia’s early parliamentary vote on 16
March may have surprised even the election’s mastermind himself . Serbian
Progressive Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s deputy prime minister, read the moment unmistakably.
The EU had kicked of f  the long-awaited negotiations with Serbia in January this year, af ter
granting it candidate status. The break-through in the EU-led Serbia-Kosovo talks on
normalisation of  relations had gone down without a polit ical ripple. All that remained was to
tap into the disaf f ection of  the transit ion losers, while holding a moral high ground with
promises to root out corruption. Accordingly, the election campaign was conducted under
the banner of  a root-and-branch ref orm, albeit without of f ering policy detail. Kosovo and
the EU were barely mentioned.
According to eminent Serbian polit ical analyst
Vladimir Goati, the Serbian Progressive Party
‘hoovered’ the votes of  the disaf f ected
regardless of  party af f iliation. This was not
dif f icult given that the unemployment rate in the
country exceeds 20 per cent. The result was an
absolute majority: 158 seats f or the Serbian
Progressives in the 250-seat parliament.
Vucic’s remaining dilemma is whether to
capitalise on that victory by f orming a
government of  Progressives, or show restraint
by recruit ing a partner with a minority vote. The
latter option would address the general unease
within the country toward absolute power at the hands of  one man. Such f ears are not misplaced in a
young democracy like Serbia, with palpable memories of  rule by a strongman Slobodan Milosevic.
Civic-oriented, middle-class Serbia was decimated, along with the polit ical elite that ousted Milosevic’s
regime in October 2000. An alternative civic polit ical vision has to be built f rom scratch. Vucic, once a die-
hard nationalist and anti-Europeanist, has emerged as a torchbearer on Serbia’s journey to Europe and
rapprochement with Kosovo.
Pragmatic Europeanisation
The granting of  EU candidate status to Serbia was a true game changer in the EU-Serbia relationship. An
insider summarised succinctly this relationship by saying that ‘They pretended that they were ref orming,
and we pretended that we wanted them’.
Now the pretences are of f . The EU’s commitment to Serbia’s f uture EU membership has become
contractual. The opposition to the European project in Serbia is squashed. For the f irst t ime, there are no
opponents of  Serbia’s accession to the EU in the Serbian parliament. The road to the EU should, at least in
theory, be a matter of  painstaking alignment with the acquis communitaire, the EU’s body of  law, as a
criterion f or the eventual membership.
However, there is more to Serbia’s journey than meets the eye. Vucic’s ability to deliver an agreement on
Kosovo in the EU-sponsored talks has earned him credibility in Brussels. But, his approach to
Europeanisation may yet appear as a problem.
The current leader of  the European project is a pragmatist. Like the Serbian president, Tomislav Nikolic,
who is f rom the same party, Vucic discovered European integration as a winning ticket af ter the
Progressives lost votes in successive elections, largely f or not jumping on the European bandwagon.
Nikolic’s U-turn, and his endorsement of  Europeanisation, secured him the Serbian presidency. The
ascendance of  the Serbian Progressive Party to its present domination of  the Serbian polit ical scene has
f ollowed the same logic.
For a pragmatist, the goal of  Europe is primarily about living standards. When Vucic talks about Serbia’s
European prospects, he talks about ‘a better f uture’. This means economic development. It is not about a
‘return home’ to a community of  values, where one belongs righteously and unmistakably. This idea
mobilised the candidate states in Eastern and Central Europe and allowed them to extend their polit ical
horizons while bearing the high costs of  ref orms in the accession process. Instead, f rom the Serbian
perspective the destination of  Europe has more complex connotations.
Ambiguous destination
This week is the 15th anniversary of  the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia, when the Western alliance
intervened to protect ethnic Albanians f rom f orce unleashed by the Serbian security f orces in Kosovo.
Public commemorations of  about 2,500 Serbian civilian and military victims of  the 78-day air campaign were
held throughout the country. Around 10,000 Albanian victims of  Serbian repression, as well as of  NATO’s
‘collateral damage’, were not mentioned. Against this backdrop, the Serbian leadership articulated a more
ambiguous relationship with Europe, which they see as a supporter of  the illegit imate and unlawf ul carving
out of  the Albanian state in the Serbian heartland of  Kosovo.
This is why the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic said that the new government will be ‘neither pro-
Russian, nor pro-European, but pro-Serbian.’ And, this is why, the recognition of  Kosovo, in the words of
another of f icial, is a ‘red line’ in the negotiations with the EU. Similarly, when asked about Russia’s
annexation of  Crimea, Vucic was unequivocal in saying that Serbia will not have a hostile att itude towards
Russia, adding that ‘we cannot be lectured about this (international norms) by those who trod lightly on
Serbia’s territorial integrity’.
The start of  the negotiations between Serbia and the EU depended on the implementation of  the Belgrade-
Pristina agreement. The moment the ballots in Serbia were counted, the same message arrived f rom
Western capitals and f rom Brussels. Serbia and Kosovo’s prime ministers were summoned f or the next
round of  talks. This reinf orces another message f rom Brussels: progress in Serbia’s European integration
is linked with progress in normalisation of  relations with Kosovo.
Why might this become a problem? Serbia has thus f ar successf ully managed its dual-approach, combining
progress in the European integration process with non-recognition of  Kosovo. The secret of  that success
lies in, what I have called in a recently-published article, ‘discursive denial’. Playing up the idea of  non-
recognition of  Kosovo’s independence was used strategically by Serbia’s successive leaderships to
obf uscate and minimise the extent to which it has already had to cede actual authority to Kosovo. A recent
poll by Ipsos Strategic Marketing conf irms my f indings: the Status of  Kosovo tops the list of  policy areas
that those polled consider ‘not discussed suf f iciently objectively or truthf ully’.
The same poll also conf irms ambiguity about Serbia’s destination, with 46 per cent of  those polled having a
positive attitude towards Russia. This compares with 27 per cent with a posit ive, and 41 per cent with a
negative attitude towards the EU. This does not, however, stop even those who have a negative view of
the EU f rom declaring that they would vote f or EU accession if  asked in a ref erendum. Polling indicates that
54 per cent would currently vote in f avour.
Integrating normalisation of  relations with Pristina into the EU accession process means Serbia will have to
recognise Kosovo’s sovereignty in ever more policy areas. As Serbia moves f orward to the EU, and as the
costs of  adaptation begin to rise through implementation of  long-delayed economic ref orms, the question
is whether just pragmatism, without conviction, debate or liberal vision, will be enough to see Serbia
through the process.
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